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CRIME, SURVEILLANCE, AND 
COMMUNITIES 
I. Bennett Capers*  
ABSTRACT 
We have become a surveillance state.  Cameras—both those 
controlled by the state, and those installed by private entities—watch 
our every move, at least in public.  For the most part, courts have 
deemed this public surveillance to be beyond the purview of the 
Fourth Amendment, meaning that it goes largely unregulated—a 
cause for alarm for many civil libertarians.  This Article challenges 
these views and suggests that we must listen to communities in 
thinking about cameras and other surveillance technologies.  For 
many communities, public surveillance not only has the benefit of 
deterring crime and aiding in the apprehension of criminals.  It can 
also function to monitor the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police 
brutality, and ultimately increase perceptions of legitimacy.  The 
question thus becomes not how we can use the Fourth Amendment to 
limit public surveillance, but rather: “How can we use the Fourth 
Amendment to harness public surveillance’s full potential?” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Quite simply, we have become a surveillance state.  Cameras—
both those controlled by the state, and those installed by private 
entities—watch our every move, at least in public.  For the most part, 
this public surveillance is unregulated, beyond the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment.  To many civil libertarians, the extent of public 
surveillance infringes upon our rights of privacy and anonymity, and 
as such should be cause for alarm.  On the other side of the debate, 
law and order advocates argue that mass surveillance is a necessary 
tool in deterring crime and apprehending criminals. 
The goal of this Article is not to settle this debate, but rather to call 
attention to the benefits of mass surveillance that are too often left 
out of the discussion.  This Article also urges that we listen to 
communities.  For many communities, public surveillance not only 
deters crime and aids in the apprehension of criminals; it can also 
function to monitor the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police 
brutality, and ultimately increase perceptions of legitimacy.  The 
question thus becomes not how we can use the Fourth Amendment to 
limit public surveillance, but rather, how can we use the Fourth 
Amendment to harness public surveillance’s full potential? 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I gives a brief overview of the 
extent to which we already live in a state of perpetual surveillance.  
Part II then turns to the Fourth Amendment and to the general 
consensus that surveillance cameras in public are not subject to 
Fourth Amendment regulation.  It then offers another reading of 
Fourth Amendment cases, one that suggests that mass surveillance 
should be subject to constitutional regulation.  Although my 
argument is one for regulation, I am in fact in favor of more 
surveillance, not less.  I make the reasons for this stance clear in Part 
III. 
I.  WATCHING YOU 
To say that we are now being watched is to put it mildly.  Consider 
New York City, which recently partnered with Microsoft Corporation 
to roll out a new public surveillance device called the Domain 
Awareness System.1  Described as something “straight out of a sci-fi 
 
 1. See Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million 
Super Computer System that Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate 
Readers and Crime Reports, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2012, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computer-
system-data-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-crime-reports-article-1.1132135; 
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novel,”2 the Domain Awareness System aggregates and analyzes 
information from approximately 3,000 surveillance cameras around 
the city and allows the police to scan license plates, cross-check 
criminal databases, measure radiation levels, and more.3  Moreover, 
this surveillance system operates continually—twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week.4  As New York City Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg said when he announced the new surveillance system—
which in fact had already been in use for perhaps a year5—“We’re not 
your mom-and-pop’s Police Department anymore.”6 
The Domain Awareness System is just the latest example of New 
York’s use of surveillance technology.  The use of video surveillance 
as a crime prevention and detection tool dates back to at least 1973, 
when cameras were installed in Times Square.7  By 1983, there were 
approximately seventy-six cameras monitoring Columbus Circle in 
New York City, and another 136 in Times Square.8  By 1997, as part 
of then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s broad crime-prevention program, 
cameras also dotted Central Park, subway stations, and numerous 
“high crime” public housing projects.9  As of 2006, there were nearly 
4,200 public and private surveillance cameras in lower Manhattan 
alone, a five-fold increase from 1998.10  By 2010, the number had 
 
Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System Is Watching You, NY MAG. 
DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 9, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/ 
2012/08/nypd-domain-awareness-system-microsoft-is-watching-you.html. 
 2. Coscarelli, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Although the Domain Awareness System was publicly announced in August 
2012, there is at least one reference to the use of the system in 2010. See Bob 
Hennelly, A Look Inside the NYPD Surveillance System, WNYC NEWS (May 21, 
2010), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2010/may/21/a-look-inside-the-nypd-
surveillance-system.  
 6. Coscarelli, supra note 1. 
 7. Murray Schumach, Police to Use TV to Scan Times Sq. Area for Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 1973, at A1. 
 8. BILGE YESIL, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: POWER AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY 
LIFE 41 (2009).  
 9. Randy Kennedy, Police Cameras Planned for More Housing Projects, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/13/nyregion/police-cameras-
planned-for-more-housing-projects.html; David Kocieniewski, Television Cameras 
May Survey Public Places, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/ 
10/06/nyregion/television-cameras-may-survey-public-places.html. 
 10. YESIL, supra note 8, at 43–44.  The use of private surveillance cameras for 
government purposes is so common that the distinction is becoming irrelevant.  As 
Jack Balkin recently noted, “the line between public and private modes of 
surveillance blurred if not vanished.” Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the 
National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008). 
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increased such that if you were in a public space in lower Manhattan, 
the odds would be “pretty good” that you were being watched.11  The 
same is true of Times Square.  As one journalist noted: 
In Times Square, perhaps more than any other place in the city, our 
movements are being recorded a hundred different ways: from a few 
stories up the side of the Bertelsmann building, from inside the plate 
glass of the Bank of America branch, as we pass through turnstiles 
of a subway station, at the point of purchase in seemingly every 
store. . . . 
 [Cities] used to be places to lose yourself in the thrilling 
anonymity of a crowd . . . .  It’s hard to adjust to the idea that 
cities—New York in particular, and Times Square most of all—are 
now places where unseen watchers can monitor your every move.12 
The prevalence of surveillance technology is not unique to New 
York City.  In Washington, D.C., the Metropolitan Police 
Department has plans to consolidate cameras owned by city agencies 
(estimated to number more than 5,200) into one network called the 
Video Interoperability for Public Safety.13  The network will allow the 
police to monitor not only their own cameras, but also those 
belonging to other agencies such as the public school system, the 
public housing system, and the parks system.14 
Chicago’s Operation Virtual Shield includes at least 2,250 cameras, 
250 of which have biometric technology.15  Baltimore’s CitiWatch had 
at least four hundred cameras equipped with low light, pan, tilt, and 
zoom capabilities by 2007.16  Even small towns have turned to camera 
surveillance: according to a 2006 survey, at least two hundred towns 
and cities in thirty-seven states reported either actual use of video 
cameras, or plans for their use.17  In addition to video cameras, 
 
 11. Hennelly, supra note 5. 
 12. Ariel Kaminer, Has the Big Apple Become the Big Eyeball?, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2010, at MB1. 
 13. D.C. Police Set to Monitor 5000 Cameras, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/9/dc-police-set-to-monitor-5000-
cameras/. 
 14. Id. 
 15. YESIL, supra note 8, at 38.  
 16. Id. at 35. 
 17. Charlie Savage, US Doles Out Millions for Street Cameras, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 
12, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/08/12/ 
us_doles_out_millions_for_street_cameras/; Lisa Hoffman, Under Surveillance: 
Government Spy Cameras Proliferate, FREEDOM WORKS (June 22, 2006), 
http://www.freedomworks.org/news/under-surveillance-government-spy-cameras-
prolifer.  
CAPERS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:31 PM 
2013] CRIME, SURVEILLANCE, & COMMUNITIES 963 
municipalities may choose to employ license plate readers and 
automatic license plate recognition programs that incorporate GPS 
data.  Financial support for such programs typically comes from the 
federal government, which is currently “the principal funder of car 
tracking.”18 
This is not just an American phenomenon.  By some estimates, 
Great Britain, “the champion of CCTV surveillance,”19 has access to 
between “two and three million cameras . . . creating more video 
images per capita than any other country in the world.”20  British 
civilians can even earn cash rewards by watching live-streamed CCTV 
footage on their home computers and assisting the police in 
apprehending criminals.21 
Yet, the number of cameras tells only half the story.  Cameras 
today go well beyond the grainy images we tend to associate with the 
cameras used on television programs like America’s Most Wanted.  
Today’s cameras are often enhanced by facial recognition 
technology.22  As Laura Donohue recently explained: 
Complex algorithms measure the size, angle, and distance between 
features, enabling identification based on facial characteristics.  
Paired with video, this technology allows governments to observe 
and record actions in public space and to recall this information for 
any number of reasons.  Such remote tracking is not the equivalent 
of placing a tail on a suspect.  It requires no suspicion of any 
individual; it functions as warrantless mass surveillance.  It is 
inexpensive.  It has perfect recall.  And it generates terabytes of new 
knowledge.23 
There is even a new device called MORIS—the Mobile Offender 
Recognition and Identification System—attachable to an iPhone.  It 
 
 18. David Rosen, The Police Know Where You’re Driving, SALON (Dec. 6, 2012, 
10:24 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/12/06/the_police_know_where_youre_driving. 
 19. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places 
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 220 (2002). 
 20. Id. at 220–21. 
 21. Internet Eyes, Fighting Crime from Home, ON THE MEDIA (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://www.onthemedia.org/2010/oct/08/internet-eyes-fighting-crime-from-home/ 
transcript/. 
 22. See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, The New Security: Cameras that Never Forget 
Your Face, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at G6 (discussing New York City’s use of facial 
recognition cameras). 
 23. Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 409 
(2012). 
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allows an officer, with little more than a wave of his iPhone, to scan 
someone’s iris and do facial recognition comparisons.24 
For many, the widespread use of cameras conjures images of Big 
Brother in George Orwell’s 1984, though the surveillance in Orwell’s 
dystopia may seem largely low-tech compared to what exists now.  It 
is also suggestive of Foucault’s re-imagining of Bentham’s physical 
panopticon to a less visible but more oppressive one: that societal 
networks themselves are emblematic of a larger carceral society.25 
Cameras are everywhere.  The question is what to do about it. 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM 
The Fourth Amendment, which on its face protects individuals 
from government searches, is the source of numerous debates, many 
of which concern broad questions about the scope of government 
power.  The Fourth Amendment “problem” regarding public 
surveillance, however, is actually quite specific.  As the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment, monitoring individuals 
outside the sanctuary of their homes—as we take the dog for a walk, 
drive the kids to soccer practice, or pick up the dry cleaning—simply 
is not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.26  
This is true whether we are picking up the dry cleaning, running to a 
dental appointment, or in fact sneaking off to an adult bookstore or 
running drugs. 
To fully understand the issue of the lack of regulation of public 
surveillance, some understanding of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is useful.  Part II.A accordingly provides a brief 
overview of Fourth Amendment cases that, at least under any 
conventional reading, would seem to leave surveillance cameras 
outside of the Fourth Amendment’s purview.  Part II.B then offers an 
unconventional alternative reading of the amendment. 
 
 24. See Christopher R. Jones, “Eyephones”: A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into 
Mobile Iris Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 926 (2012).  
 25. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 280 
(Alan Sheridan trans. 1977).  Balkin makes a similar point: “During the last part of 
the twentieth century the United States began developing a new form of governance 
that features the collection, collation, and analysis of information about populations 
both in the United States and around the world.  This new form of governance is the 
National Surveillance State.” Balkin, supra note 10, at 3.  Balkin also argues that we 
have gone beyond Foucault’s panopticon model: “The Government’s most important 
technique of control is no longer watching or threatening to watch.  It is analyzing 
and drawing connections between data.” Id. at 12. 
 26. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–16 (1984); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
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A. A Conventional Reading of the Fourth Amendment 
That surveillance cameras in public are outside the purview of the 
Fourth Amendment seems so apparent from one line of Fourth 
Amendment cases that it often is accepted as a foregone conclusion.27  
Indeed, the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
that which we expose to the public is traceable at least to Katz v. 
United States, where the Court in effect retired its trespass-
dependent test in exchange for a reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.28  As the Court put it in that case—which involved the police 
surreptitiously using a bug to listen to a private telephone 
conversation—“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”29 
The line of cases that followed Katz clarified that almost any 
knowing exposure to a third party could defeat a claimed reasonable 
expectation of privacy.30  Thus, an individual’s bank transactions are 
not subject to Fourth Amendment protections; since a third party 
(the bank) is necessarily privy to those transactions, an individual 
cannot possibly have a reasonable expectation that such transactions 
will remain private.31  Similarly, the phone numbers one dials—and 
these days possibly texts as well32—are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; in dialing the numbers, a caller is necessarily 
communicating the numbers to a third party (the telephone 
company), defeating any reasonable expectation of privacy.33  Nor is 
 
 27. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 951, 953 (“The Fourth Amendment does not apply to surveillance in public.”); 
Slobogin, supra note 19, at 215 (“If the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by 
technological surveillance of a car traveling on public thoroughfares, it is unlikely to 
apply to enhancement surveillance of a person walking the streets.”). 
 28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 29. Id. at 351. 
 30. While the reasonable expectation of privacy test has predominated since Katz, 
the Court has also left in place certain historical distinctions, such as that between the 
home (protected), the curtilage (somewhat protected), and open fields (not 
protected). See generally United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 31. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976). But see Cal. Bankers Ass’n 
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 87–90 (1974). 
 32. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1309, 1315 (2012) (observing that “text-messaging systems store copies of what is said 
on each endpoint and on network servers in the middle, too”). 
 33. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  Of course, as Justice Sotomayor has 
recently observed, the premise that an individual can never have a reasonable 
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one’s subscriber information or one’s web browsing activity 
protected; again, the information is being provided to a third party 
(the system operator).34  The government can even “search” through 
one’s trash bags without having to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment.35  As Justice White observed in California v. 
Greenwood,36 by placing their rubbish on the curb for pick up by the 
municipality’s trash collector, “respondents exposed their garbage to 
the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment 
protection.  It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on 
or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, 
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”37  
The government may even observe one’s activities in a bathroom stall 
by looking through a gap in a bathroom stall door, so long as a 
hypothetical member of the public could do the same.38  One’s 
conversations with a close but duplicitous friend are likewise outside 
the purview of the Fourth Amendment.39  “[O]ne contemplating 
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be 
reporting to the police.”40 
 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to a service provider “is ill 
suited to the digital age,” and as such may need to be reconsidered. United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 34. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[C]omputer users do not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they 
have conveyed it to another person—the system operator.”); United States v. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that government tracking of which 
websites a user visited and whom he exchanged emails with “are constitutionally 
indistinguishable from the use of a pen register . . . .”).  For a discussion of such 
surveillance, see generally Christian David Hammel Schultz, Note, Unrestricted 
Federal Agent: “Carnivore” and the Need to Revise the Pen Register Statute, 76 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215 (2001).  Indeed, given the wealth of information available 
to the government from third parties, the government has access to “digital dossiers” 
for each of us. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1084, 1092 (2002); see also Orin S. Kerr, The 
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 829 (2004) (noting that “communications 
technologies allow owners and operators of communications networks to build 
complete dossiers on their users”). 
 35. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988); see also United States v. 
Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 
400 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 36. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37.  
 37. Id. at 40. 
 38. United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 39. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971). 
 40. Id. at 752. 
CAPERS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013  8:31 PM 
2013] CRIME, SURVEILLANCE, & COMMUNITIES 967 
Although the Court has not ruled specifically on the government 
use of surveillance cameras,41 three cases are close enough that many 
scholars deem the issue settled.42  In United States v. Knotts,43 law 
enforcement officers investigating Armstrong, a suspected drug 
manufacturer, secretly installed a tracking device inside a five-gallon 
container of chloroform they expected Armstrong to pick up.44  The 
officers then used the tracking device to monitor Armstrong’s 
movements in his vehicle, which led the officers to Knotts.45  The 
Court rejected Knotts’ claim that the use of the tracking device 
amounted to a search, and thus required compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment.46  A vehicle, the Court noted, “has little capacity for 
escaping public scrutiny.  It travels public thoroughfares where both 
its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”47  Because “[v]isual 
surveillance from public places”48 along the route Armstrong took 
could have revealed the same information to the police, i.e., since the 
information was “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to 
look,”49 there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy.50  The 
Court added, clearly underestimating the technological advances that 
lay ahead, “Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibit[s] the police 
 
 41. There is at least one analogous lower court case.  In United States v. 
Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the use of a surveillance camera in a quasi-
public space at a public hospital to monitor a subject was not a Fourth Amendment 
search, since the room had large windows through which the target’s actions were 
also visible.  The court added: 
[The defendant] would have us adopt a theory of the Fourth Amendment 
akin to J.K. Rowling’s Invisibility Cloak, to create at will a shield 
impenetrable to law enforcement view even in the most public places.  
However, the fabric of the Fourth Amendment does not stretch that far.  He 
did not have an expectation of privacy in the public mailroom that society 
would accept as reasonable. 
328 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 42. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 10, at 20 (“Currently, governments are free to 
place cameras in public places like streets and parks because there is no expectation 
of privacy there.”); see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the 
Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks 
Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (2004) (noting that under 
contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, pervasive video surveillance “is not 
a ‘search’ at all”). 
 43. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 44. Id. at 278. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 285. 
 47. Id. at 281 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 
 48. Id. at 282. 
 49. Id. at 281. 
 50. Id.  
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from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth 
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in 
this case.”51 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in another public tracking 
case, United States v. Karo.52  There, the government installed a 
tracking device in a can of ether that Karo had ordered from a 
government informant and then used the device to track Karo’s 
movement to his house and other locations implicating other co-
conspirators.53  While the Court ruled that using the device to track 
movements inside Karo’s house constituted a search subject to Fourth 
Amendment protections,54 the use of the device to monitor travel 
outside the home, where one could have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, was not.55 
Most recently, in United States v. Jones,56 which involved the use of 
a GPS tracking device to monitor a target’s movement for thirty days, 
the Court reiterated its view that the Fourth Amendment provides no 
protection for activities conducted in public.  Though the Court 
reversed on other grounds—finding a Fourth Amendment violation 
because the government trespassed onto a constitutionally protected 
area when it attached the tracking device to the suspect’s car—the 
 
 51. Id. at 282. 
 52. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 53. Id. at 708–10. 
 54. Id. at 716.  The Court has always extended the greatest Fourth Amendment 
protections to the home, whether it be in the form of requiring arrest warrants for an 
arrest in the home, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86 (1950), or in requiring 
a warrant for almost any search that involves the home. See Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2000) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961))); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–12 (1981) (requiring a search 
warrant to search third-party’s home for suspect).  Of course, this enhanced 
protection of the home is not without consequences.  David Sklansky observes that 
treating the home as private means that “leaving one’s home means losing some 
privacy—that the price of full privacy is not going out.” David Alan Sklansky, Back 
to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and the Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 192 (2002).  He 
adds that this approach distributes privacy unequally, since those with more money 
and larger homes will necessarily have more privacy than those with small homes. Id.  
For more on the class implications of the distribution of privacy, see William J. 
Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1265 (1999). 
 55. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713–14. 
 56. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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Court left intact the general notion that what one exposes in public is 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment.57 
Although many scholars have criticized this line of cases, they 
stand collectively for the proposition that the use of surveillance 
cameras to monitor activity that occurs in public is reasonable and 
therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment.58  Following the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue, the Tenth Circuit held in 
United States v. Jackson59 that video cameras installed on telephone 
poles are not subject to Fourth Amendment oversight, since such 
cameras observe “only what any passerby would easily have been 
able to observe.”60  If a constable can stand at a busy intersection or a 
cop can walk a beat to make sure no criminal activity is afoot—in 
other words, if a law enforcement officer can use his or her eyes to 
observe things in public, such as Detective McFadden did in the other 
seminal Fourth Amendment case, Terry v. Ohio61—then certainly a 
surveillance camera (nothing more than a mechanical cop, a one-
function Robocop62) can do the same thing.  Knotts, Karo, and Jones 
support this conventional view.  Of course, the problem with 
conventional thinking is that it tends to be, well, rather conventional. 
B. A Non-Conventional Reading of the Fourth Amendment 
The clear implication of the line of Fourth Amendment cases just 
described is that the use of technology to monitor the activities of 
individuals in public spaces is not subject to the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment.  After all, there can be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy—which until recently was the sine qua non of 
 
 57. Id. at 951–52 (noting that the Court’s decision does “not deviate[] from the 
understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search”). 
 58. Cf. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 101 (4th ed. 
2006) (“[T]he implication of Knotts is that as long as monitoring is limited to 
movements of persons in non-private areas, the government is free to conduct 
constant surveillance of citizens.”); Slobogin, supra note 19, at 215 (“If the Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated by technological surveillance of a car traveling on 
public thoroughfares, it is unlikely to apply to enhanced surveillance of a person 
walking the streets.”). 
 59. 213 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 
(2000). 
 60. Id. at 1281. 
 61. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 62. I am thinking here of the 1980s film. See ROBOCOP (Orion Pictures 1987). 
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Fourth Amendment applicability63—where individuals are in public 
and, almost by definition, have “voluntarily conveyed [their activities 
in public] to anyone who wanted to look . . . .”64  True, such data will 
disclose “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion 
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense 
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, 
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”65  But because these 
trips are predicated on movement in public, they are constitutionally 
unprotected. 
But this reading of the Fourth Amendment is not inevitable.  This 
section offers an alternative reading to reach a different conclusion: 
that the use of surveillance cameras in public does implicate 
reasonable expectations of privacy, and thus is subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation, requiring either a warrant or at least 
reasonableness.  Of course, other scholars have argued that 
surveillance should be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.  
Christopher Slobogin, for example, uses empirical evidence to argue 
that members of society actually do expect some level of privacy and 
even anonymity as they go about their affairs.66  My argument reaches 
the same conclusion, but via a different route: through a line of 
Supreme Court cases that also begins with Katz, but moreover 
includes Katz’s other progeny, United States v. White67 and Alderman 
v. United States.68  In short, this reading gives weight to the distinction 
the Court makes between an invited ear (White) and an uninvited 
one (Katz).  The argument is that it is one thing to be observed by a 
police officer, even one in plain clothes, who is physically present, but 
it is another thing entirely to be observed by a police officer via a 
remote video camera, particularly when one is unaware of the 
camera.  The former scenario is analogous to an invited ear, re-
conceptualized as an invited eye.  The latter is analogous to an 
uninvited ear, re-conceptualized as an uninvited eye. 
This line of cases also starts with Katz.  Recall that in Katz, the 
police used an electronic listening device to eavesdrop surreptitiously 
 
 63. Although the reasonable expectation test has predominated since Katz, last 
term in United States v. Jones, the Court appeared to revive the trespass test that 
predated Katz. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
 64. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).  
 65. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009). 
 66. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007). 
 67. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 68. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
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on Katz’s private telephone conversations.69  Rejecting its prior 
reliance on the issue of whether there had been a technical trespass 
onto a constitutionally protected area, the Court instead asked 
whether the agents “violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably 
relied . . . .”70  Or as more precisely formulated by Justice Harlan in 
his now-famous concurrence, whether the defendant had an 
expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”71  The Court concluded that Katz had such an 
expectation, and that accordingly, the FBI violated Katz’s rights by 
not complying with constitutional standards and securing a warrant.72 
What is significant is that the Court distinguished Katz just a few 
years later in a case that also involved the surreptitious recording of 
conversations.  In United States v. White,73 agents used a listening and 
recording device to record White’s conversations.  The crucial 
difference in the case was that, whereas Katz’s conversations were 
monitored and recorded without the consent of any of the involved 
parties, White’s conversations were monitored and recorded with the 
consent of one the participants—a government informant.74  The 
Court thus distinguished between nonconsensual monitoring, which is 
subject to Fourth Amendment regulations, and consensual 
monitoring, which is not.  The Court observed that when a person 
enters into a conversation, he assumes the risk that the listener may 
report the conversation to another person, including a police officer.75  
As such, there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy.  Nor can 
there be any legitimate expectation that a listener would not also 
record the conversation: 
 Concededly, a police agent who conceals his police connections 
may write down for official use his conversations with a defendant 
and testify concerning them, without a warrant, authorizing his 
encounters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the 
latter’s Fourth Amendment rights.  For constitutional purposes, no 
different result is required if the agent instead of immediately 
reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either 
 
 69. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).  
 70. Id. at 353. 
 71. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 72. Id. at 359.  
 73. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).  White, in turn, was consistent with two earlier cases, 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1967) and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 
747 (1952). 
 74. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47. 
 75. See id. at 750. 
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(1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he 
is carrying on his person, (2) or carries radio equipment which 
simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording 
equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the 
transmitting frequency.  If the conduct and revelations of an agent 
operating without electronic equipment do not invade the 
defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, 
neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations 
made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from 
the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose 
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.76 
In short, the Court distinguished between the invited ear, for which 
citizens assume some risk, and the uninvited ear, for which citizens do 
not, though the term “invited” has never fully captured the relevant 
distinction.  Eavesdropping is unregulated so long as a duplicitous ear 
is actually present.  For example, if two criminals dine in a restaurant, 
it doesn’t matter whether one of them is surreptitiously recording the 
conversation, or whether their waiter or an adjacent diner is 
recording what they can overhear of the conversation.  Because the 
duplicitous ear is physically present, the recorded conversation will be 
deemed consensual and outside the regulation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  By contrast, a bug simply planted in a vase on the table 
does trigger Fourth Amendment regulation, at least when no 
duplicitous ear is actually present.  In other words, while Supreme 
Court precedent makes clear that citizens must assume the risk that 
any person in earshot will turn out to be duplicitous, amounting to a 
visible bug,77 citizens need not assume the risk that there will be bugs 
even when no one around is duplicitous.78  A majority of state courts 
make the same distinction.79 
It is precisely this interstitial space that provides a foundation for 
subjecting covert public surveillance to Fourth Amendment 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. The term “visible bug” comes from Dressler, who uses it to describe a false 
friend with an invisible purpose. See DRESSLER, supra note 58, § 7.05[A]. 
 78. This is not to suggest that this distinction is logical or even inevitable.  As 
Stephen Saltzburg and Daniel Capra rhetorically put it, “Why does a person assume 
the risk that a friend will record an incriminating conversation, but not the risk that 
the government will use a wiretap and record an incriminating conversation?” 
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND COMMENTARY 475 (7th ed. 2004). 
 79. See United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1225 (7th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Stone, 305 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D.D.C. 1969); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 
505, 511–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); cf. Kee v. City of Rowlett, Tex., 247 F.3d 206, 213 
(5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977).  
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protections.  Even though the Court has made clear that a person 
must assume the risk that an ear is duplicitous, the Court has also 
drawn a line.  The crucial factor in determining whether 
eavesdropping is a Fourth Amendment search is not only whether the 
ear was invited or not.  It is also important to inquire whether the ear 
is actually, physically, or corporeally present.  Thus, in Alderman v. 
United States,80 the Fourth Amendment was violated when an 
informant, the proverbial invited ear, planted a listening device to 
monitor third-party conversations.81  While the informant was 
permitted to record conversations in his presence without offending 
the Fourth Amendment, that permission ceased the moment he was 
no longer physically present.82  The Ninth Circuit applied similar 
reasoning to non-consensual video surveillance, albeit in a non-public 
location, in United States v. Nerber.83  There, informants used a 
hidden video camera to film a narcotics transaction, and the camera 
continued to record when they were absent from the room.84  The 
audio portion of the recording clearly violated Title III, which 
governs interceptions of oral communications.  Turning to the video 
portion, the court held that this recording violated the defendants’ 
rights under the Fourth Amendment, since it is not reasonable to 
think that one will be subject to video surveillance by a false friend 
who is not actually present.85 
I mention the line of cases from Katz to Alderman to White 
because their arc suggests a different outcome in any analysis of 
surveillance cases.  It suggests that it is not the hypothetical presence 
of a law enforcement officer that should matter, but rather the actual 
presence.  It suggests that just as citizens are not required to assume 
the risk that they will be monitored by a listening device when no 
duplicitous ear is actually present—indeed, the very situation in 
 
 80. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
 81. Id. at 179–80. 
 82. See also United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(approving use of fixed monitoring devices as long as they are only activated when a 
consenting party is present).  This is consistent with the Wiretap Act, which regulates 
the law enforcement interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. See 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-7.302 (2012).  It should be noted that the Wiretap Act 
does not apply to silent video. See United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir. 
2010); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679–80 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 83. 222 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 84. Id. at 599. 
 85. Id.  
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Katz—citizens are not required to assume the risk that they will be 
monitored by a watching device when no duplicitous eye is actually 
present.  Instead of suggesting that a person on a public street does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared 
to recognize, the answer is the opposite.86 
This is not to say that there are not other cases that might support a 
right to privacy in the public surveillance context.  As others have 
noted, Knotts left open the possibility that “dragnet” surveillance 
would offend the Fourth Amendment.87  In Kyllo v. United States,88 
which involved the government use of a thermal imaging device on a 
suspect’s home, the Court also expressed its concern about the 
growing use of technology to engage in surveillance.89  Even Judge 
Posner, who has written that tailing a suspect and using video 
surveillance to do the same are functionally equivalent for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, has recognized that a different result might be 
compelled should the police engage in “wholesale surveillance,” 
writing: 
It would be premature to rule that such a program of mass 
surveillance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth 
Amendment—that it could not be a search because it would merely 
be an efficient alternative to hiring another ten million police 
officers to tail every vehicle on the nation’s roads.90 
And based on the Court’s recent decision in Jones, it seems that 
the five members of the Court are open to reading the Fourth 
Amendment as imposing some limits on long-term, warrantless 
surveillance, at least when such surveillance is targeted at a particular 
individual.91  My point here is not to preclude an argument for the 
regulation of public surveillance based on these cases.  Rather, my 
 
 86. Another analogy is to the restroom surveillance cases.  Courts recognize a 
distinction between an officer peering through a bathroom stall door to observe 
illegal activity, and the use of a covert surveillance camera to observe illegal activity.  
The former, because an actual eye is present, is not a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 
1989).  By contrast, the latter is a search subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. 
See, e.g., Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1116–17 (E.D. Pa. 1975); People v. 
Triggs, 506 P.2d 232 (1973).  
 87. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).  
 88. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 89. Id.  
 90. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 91. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); 
id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[L]onger term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”). 
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point is to suggest another route to privacy, one that flows naturally 
from Katz, White, and Alderman. 
Of course, to say that camera surveillance is subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation is only the first step.  That statement neither 
answers whether probable cause or a warrant is required or whether 
such surveillance need only comply with the reasonableness clause of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Several factors suggest that reasonableness 
will suffice.  For one, mass surveillance neither restricts the 
movement of individuals nor interferes with any tangible property 
rights.92  While it is true that overt surveillance may chill movement 
somewhat, that intrusion is de minimis.93  And when such surveillance 
is covert, the intrusion is non-existent.  By contrast, the surveillance 
serves a substantial public interest.  Overt surveillance deters crime; 
covert surveillance aids in solving crime once it occurs.  Moreover, it 
does so in a way that mere manpower, given limited resources, 
cannot.  In addition, such surveillance responds to special needs 
beyond law enforcement, insofar as it serves the larger purpose of 
ensuring public safety—a concern that has become all the more acute 
since 9/1194—and is applied in a non-arbitrary or non-discriminatory 
manner.  The Court has held that such special needs searches are 
almost by default reasonable.95 
 
 92. It is straightforward that a camera does not have the ability to either stop you 
from walking or driving, or to seize something from your person.  Maybe, in some 
Orwellian sense, a person might feel more inhibited in their movements, but I think 
the practical import of the situation supersedes any overly dystopic musings. 
 93. Indeed, overt surveillance may not constitute a Fourth Amendment search at 
all, since an individual who knows that he is being watched cannot have an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize.  To the extent that an 
individual has choice in whether to travel on roads that he knows to be subject to 
surveillance, the individual’s consent would appear to further render any surveillance 
reasonable. Cf. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990) (“There are various 
elements . . . that can make a search [reasonable]—one of which is the consent of the 
person . . . .”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (although 
voluntary consent does not function as a waiver, it does function to render a search 
reasonable). 
 94. It is telling that the Domain Awareness System in New York City emphasizes 
counterterrorism in its statement of purpose. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, DOMAIN 
AWARENESS SYSTEM PUBLIC SECURITY PRIVACY GUIDELINES (2009), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_security_priv
acy_guidelines.pdf. 
 95. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444 (1990) (applying special needs test to permit highway sobriety 
checkpoint); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permitting 
highway checkpoints to search for illegal aliens).  For more on the “special needs” 
exception, see Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 254 (2011).  
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What are the implications of this approach?  It suggests that cities 
and towns would have some flexibility in using cameras as tools of 
crime control and public safety.  Indeed, it suggests that one check, in 
addition to the judicial check, will be the democratic process itself.96 
For example, using a reasonableness test, society might conclude 
that it is perfectly reasonable to maintain surveillance cameras in a 
location deemed to be a terrorist target, such as Times Square.  
Indeed, it was such surveillance cameras that contributed to the arrest 
of Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a bomb in Times 
Square in 2010.97  Conversely, it may not be reasonable, in Fourth 
Amendment terms, to maintain surveillance cameras at a Lover’s 
Lane.  Cameras in high crime areas may be reasonable; cameras 
outside the local strip club, or inside public restrooms, likely are not 
reasonable. 
In sum, while a conventional reading of Fourth Amendment 
cases—at least the line of cases from Katz to Jones—would suggest 
that the use of camera surveillance in public is not subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation, a nonconventional reading suggests 
otherwise.  By considering another line of cases, from Katz to White, 
a strong argument can be made that camera surveillance in public is 
in fact subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.  In addition, a 
balancing of the intrusion to the individual and the needs of the 
public suggests that such surveillance will comply with the Fourth 
Amendment so long as such surveillance is reasonable.98 
 
 96. On the role of the democratic process as providing a check on law 
enforcement overreach, especially when the “law-abiding” majority is affected, see 
Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 131 
(2010); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 588 (1992) (“Fourth Amendment regulation is 
usually unnecessary where large numbers of affected parties are involved.  Citizens 
can protect themselves in the same way that they protect themselves against most 
kinds of government misconduct—they can throw the rascals out.”).  This is also 
consistent with Orin Kerr’s view that legislative bodies, not courts, should do the 
heavy lifting in terms of regulating the state’s use of technology vis-à-vis its citizens. 
See Kerr, supra note 34, at 806.  
 97. William Saletan, Luck Tape: Surveillance Cameras and the Times Square 
Bombing, SLATE (May 4, 2010, 1:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
health_and_science/human_nature/2010/05/luck_tape.html. 
 98. Christopher Slobogin, in his thoughtful response to my argument, rightfully 
observes that my unconventional reading is predicated on the assumption that no 
actual duplicitous eye is present.  This assumption is weaker, he points out, when in 
fact human eyes—albeit non-duplicitous ones—are present, and when the 
surveillance system includes notice.  In these situations, the mere presence of an 
actual eye, even if not duplicitous, or noticed, would seem to be enough to render the 
surveillance a non-search under the Court’s longstanding “assumption of risk” 
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In a way, of course, it is curious that I am pushing for any 
regulation of surveillance, since as the next Part makes clear, I am in 
favor of more surveillance, not less.  Perhaps the best way of stating 
my position is this: I want more surveillance, but I want that 
surveillance to be reasonable.  Why am I pushing for more public 
surveillance?  To be sure, such surveillance can do significant work in 
preventing crime and apprehending criminals.  Though contested, this 
work is well known and so I do not recite it here.  But there is other 
work that surveillance does—work that has not been sufficiently 
attended to or factored into the equation.  That work includes 
combating police abuses, whether such abuses are in the form of 
excessive force, or the repeated micro-aggressions that result from 
racial profiling.99  There is yet another reason I am pushing for more 
public surveillance: because I believe in listening to communities. 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SOLUTION 
It is now quite common for civil libertarians and Fourth 
Amendment scholars to decry this state of under-regulated mass 
surveillance.  Slobogin describes mass surveillance as “an insidious 
assault on our freedom”100 that threatens our ability “to express what 
we believe, to do what we want to do, to be the type of person we 
really are.”101  The American Bar Association has proposed a range of 
 
rationale. See Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over Camera Surveillance, 
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 994 (2013).  While I do not entirely disagree with 
Slobogin, I cannot but hope that the Court would look at mass surveillance cases 
differently.  There is something fundamental about having to travel in public, 
rendering any suggestion that one “voluntarily” assumes the risk of being observed in 
public weak indeed.  Put differently, imagine a city where surveillance cameras are 
literally everywhere.  Can we really say the inhabitants of the city have assumed the 
risk of being observed in public, or is it more accurate to say that they have no 
choice?  I am reminded here of a case I teach in my Criminal Law class, Pottinger v. 
City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992), where the court enjoined the 
enforcement of laws that prohibited sleeping or bathing in public, where the laws 
were used to arrest the homeless, and the enforcement of such laws in effect 
penalized them for performing essential, life-sustaining acts.  Just as sleeping or 
bathing in public ceases to be a choice for those who are truly homeless, going out in 
public (or directing someone else to go out in public on your behalf) ceases to be a 
choice for most of us. 
 99. I borrow this term from Peggy Davis, who uses it to describe the ways in 
which minorities often are subjected to “stunning, automatic acts of disregard that 
stem from unconscious attitudes of [superiority],” which in turn has led many 
minorities to view the legal system as biased. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as 
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1576 (1989). 
 100. SLOBOGIN,  supra note 66, at ix (2007). 
 101. Id. at 4. 
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requirements that must be met before law enforcement agencies can 
use surveillance.102  And civil liberties groups routinely criticize the 
use of such surveillance.103  On the other side of the debate, law and 
order advocates argue that mass surveillance is a necessary tool in 
deterring crime and apprehending criminals. 
The goal of this Part is not to settle the debate, but rather to call 
attention to other benefits of mass surveillance that should be 
considered.  This Part also urges that we listen to communities.104  For 
many communities, public surveillance has the potential to do more 
than simply deter crime and aid in the apprehension of law-
breakers.105  Public surveillance can also function to monitor the 
police, reduce racial profiling, curb police brutality, and ultimately 
increase perceptions of legitimacy.  The issue thus becomes not how 
we can use the Fourth Amendment to limit public surveillance, but 
rather how we can use the Fourth Amendment to harness public 
surveillance’s full potential. 
The potential benefits of surveillance cameras become apparent 
when we consider two aspects of policing that I have written about 
previously: racial profiling and police brutality.106  Consider racial 
profiling.  As I have argued before, here the numbers are the issue.107  
Recent numbers from New York City’s stop-and-frisk initiative are 
particularly revealing.  In New York, African Americans and 
Hispanics constitute over 80% of the individuals stopped, a 
percentage far greater than their representation in the population.108  
 
 102. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: PART B: TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL 
SURVEILLANCE (3d ed. 1999). 
 103. See, e.g., Hennelly, supra note 5 (noting NYCLU protests). 
 104. On the advantages of listening to communities, see Dan M. Kahan & Tracey 
L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998); 
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: 
A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197. 
 105. Of course, as Alafair Burke points out in her contribution to this Colloquium, 
identifying just one community is difficult and often contested. See Alafair Burke, 
Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1014–15 (2013).  For 
more on the problem of locating a “community,” see Regina Austin, “The Black 
Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1769 (1992). 
 106. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008).  
 107. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and 
the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011). 
 108. Blacks and Hispanics make up approximately 54% of the New York City 
population. See State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2013).  
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Moreover, of the African Americans stopped, 95% were not engaged 
in activity warranting arrest.109  When considered as a percentage of 
the population, the numbers are even more jarring.  Stops of whites, if 
spread across the population of New York City, would amount to 
stops of approximately 2.6% of the white population during the 
period.110  By contrast, stops of blacks, if spread across the population, 
would amount to stops of approximately 21.1% of the population.111  
Moreover, a significant number of these stops have been found to be 
unjustified,112 prompting a class action lawsuit against the New York 
City Police Department.113 
While the numbers above concern the racial profiling of 
pedestrians, the profiling that drivers suffer is perhaps even more 
well-known.  In Whren v. United States,114 the Supreme Court 
sanctioned such pretextual stops so long as a traffic violation could 
provide a legal justification.115  A report compiled by the Maryland 
State Police revealed that, during the period examined, African 
Americans comprised 72.9% of all of the drivers stopped and 
searched along a stretch of Interstate 95, even though they comprised 
only 17.5% of the drivers violating traffic laws on the road,116 and 
 
 109. Between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2007, the New York City Police 
Department completed stop-and-frisk forms for 867,617 individuals.  Of that number, 
453,042 were black, and another 30% were Hispanic, numbers grossly 
disproportionate to their representation in the general public.  Only one in every 21.5 
blacks stopped was engaged in activity warranting arrest.  Put another way, of the 
453,053 stop-and-frisk forms police officers completed for black suspects, 
approximately 402,943 were for stopping and frisking blacks not engaged in unlawful 
activity warranting arrest. See Analysis of New NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Data, ACLU 
(Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/analysis-new-nypd-stop-and-frisk-
data-reveals-dramatic-impact-black-new-yorkers. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Al Baker & Ray Rivera, Thousands of Street Stops by New York Police Were 
Legally Unjustified, a Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A22. 
 113. Al Baker, Judge Grants Class-Action Status to Stop-and-Frisk Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES CITY ROOM (May 16, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05/16/judge-allows-class-action-status-in-stop-and-frisk-lawsuit/. 
 114. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to a pretextual car stop designed to search for drugs and other contraband, 
“conclu[ding] that so long as the stop itself was based on an actual traffic violation, 
the subjective motivation of an officer in singling out a particular motorist is 
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 862.  By so holding, the Court 
essentially “green-lighted the police practice of singling out minorities for pretextual 
traffic stops in the hope of discovering contraband.” Capers, supra note 106, at 862.   
 115. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
 116. See DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR 
NATION’S HIGHWAYS 14 (1999), available at http://www.aclu.org/racial-
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even though the hit rate for blacks, i.e., the rate at which contraband 
was found, was statistically identical to the hit rates for whites.117  
Similar findings have been made of traffic stops in Illinois,118 
Arizona,119 and Los Angeles.120  The Los Angeles study, spearheaded 
by Ian Ayres, is particularly noteworthy.  Controlling for variables 
such as the rate of violent and property crimes, Professor Ayres found 
that the stop rate was 3,400 stops higher per 10,000 residents for 
blacks than for whites, and almost 360 stops higher for Hispanics than 
for whites,121 notwithstanding the fact that blacks were 37% less likely 
to be found with weapons than searched whites, and 24% less likely 
to be found with drugs than searched whites.122  Similar numbers were 
found for searched Hispanics: Hispanics were 33% less likely to be 
found with weapons than searched whites, and 34% less likely to be 
found with drugs than searched whites.123 
Statistics also suggest that law-abiding minorities face the brunt of 
the additional discretionary decision-making permitted officers upon 
conducting a stop.124  Traffic stops, which are already largely 
 
justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways.  But this is not to 
suggest that hit rates tell the whole story.  For example, hit rates reveal nothing about 
the quantity (personal use or distribution use) or type of contraband seized.  For 
critiques of the use of hit rates, see R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, 
Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 585 (2003); Katherine Y. Barnes, 
Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial 
Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1098 (2005); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial 
Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, 
and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276–77 
(2004). 
 117. John Knowles, Nicola Perisco & Peter Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle 
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 UNIV. OF CHI. J. POL. ECON. 203, 219 (2011). 
 118. See, e.g., ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI. 
CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN LAW & JUSTICE, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY 
2008 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2009), available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/ 
trafficstop/results08.html. 
 119. ACLU OF ARIZ., DRIVING WHILE BLACK OR BROWN (2008), available at 
http://acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/DrivingWhileBlackOrBrown.pdf.  I use 
“pretextual traffic stops” here to refer to stops based on valid traffic violations where 
the primary purpose of the stop is to seek contraband or otherwise uncover criminal 
behavior. 
 120. IAN AYRES, RACIAL PROFILING AND THE LAPD: A STUDY OF RACIALLY 
DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (2008), available 
at http://www.aclu-sc.org/issues/police-practices/racial-profiling-the-lapd. 
 121. Id. at 27. 
 122. Id. at 7–8. 
 123. Id. at 8. 
 124. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The 
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 NW. U. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
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discretionary,125 permit officers the further discretion to order 
occupants out of the vehicle,126 to engage in questioning unrelated to 
the traffic stop,127 to request consent to a search,128 and without 
consent to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle.129  In certain 
jurisdictions, officers even have the discretion to make a custodial 
arrest based on the traffic violation.130  Who is ordered out of a 
vehicle, who is subject to questioning unrelated to the traffic stop, 
who is searched, and so on, are strongly correlated to race.131  As I 
have argued elsewhere, all of this is citizenship-diminishing, 
suggesting a racial hierarchy inconsistent with our professed goal of 
equal citizenship.132  And yet racial profiling remains largely 
unaddressed.133 
 
544, 560–62 (1997); see also Barnes, supra note 116, at 1113 (police search vehicles 
driven by blacks 2.6 times more frequently than vehicles driven by whites). 
 125. Traffic codes grant officers both affirmative and negative choices.  Most 
motorists drive above the speed limit.  What this means in terms of affirmative and 
negative choice is that, setting aside resources and feasibility, law enforcement 
officers have the discretion to stop all motorists, some motorists, or indeed no 
motorists exceeding the speed limit. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling out the Rule of 
Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1516–30 (2007) (arguing that specific laws do not 
necessarily resolve the problem of discretion that plagues vague laws, since even 
specific laws continue to invest officers with negative choice, i.e., the choice not to 
enforce the law or make an arrest); see also Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not 
to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of 
Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552 (1960) (“[P]olice decisions not to invoke the criminal 
process, except when reflected in gross failure of service, are not visible to the 
community.”).  
 126. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (passengers); Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (drivers). 
 127. See Harris, supra note 124, at 574; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 
333 (2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the 
traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something 
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the 
duration of the stop.”). 
 128. See Harris, supra note 124, at 546. 
 129. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2004); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696 (1983). 
 130. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 131. For extensive data on search (as opposed to stop) disparity, see Samuel R. 
Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on 
the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 561, 663–69 (2002).  In terms of how minority drivers 
and passengers are treated, see, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Question of Race Profiling 
Unanswered, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at B3.  In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, Justice 
Stevens anticipated that officers are likely to use race not only as a factor in deciding 
whom to stop, but also whom to order out of a vehicle. See 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
 132. Capers, supra note 107, at 19; see also Wendy Ruderman, Rude or Polite, 
City’s Officers Leave Raw Feelings in Stops, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at A1; 
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Consider, too, the police use of excessive force.  Although there is 
no way to determine with mathematic certainty how often police use 
excessive or unnecessary force, studies suggest that such use is far 
from infrequent.134  Furthermore, studies indicate that the police are 
more likely to engage in force when dealing with members of 
outgroups (those who are poor or minority or gender non-
conforming) than when dealing with members of ingroups.135  Social 
cognition research examining implicit biases and the use of force also 
suggests that police are more likely to open fire on minorities, and 
conversely withhold fire on whites, even when the suspects are 
engaged in identical behavior.136  In addition, several high-profile 
 
Wendy Ruderman, For Women in Street Stops, Deeper Humiliation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2012, at A1. 
 133. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive 
Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 28 
(2011). 
 134. Findings by the NAACP, based on hearings conducted in minority 
communities across the country following the police beating of Rodney King, 
indicate that many minorities do not file formal complaints against officers out of fear 
of reprisal, or discouragement, or the belief that their complaints will not be believed. 
See CHARLES OGLETREE ET AL., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY 52–54 (1995).  
Studies by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International confirm that police 
brutality is in fact widespread. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH available at 
www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo06.htm; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
REPORT 1998—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1998), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0c38.html.  A study of Bronx residents reported 
that 25% of a cross-section of residents reported witnessing police brutality or 
harassment during an arrest. See James R. Davis, A Comparison of Attitudes 
Toward the New York City Police, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 233 (1990). 
 135. There is evidence that police are more likely to use deadly force during 
encounters with minority suspects.  Such evidence was brought to the Supreme 
Court’s attention in Tennessee v. Garner in which the Court analyzed Fourth 
Amendment limitations on the use of deadly force. See Brief for Appellee-
Respondent at 23–26, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Nos. 83-1035, 83-
1070), 1984 WL 566020 (citing statistical data showing “significant disparities in the 
use of deadly force based on the race of the shooting victim/suspect and that virtually 
all of this disparity occurs as a result of the Memphis policy that allows officers to 
exercise their discretion to shoot fleeing property crime suspects.”). 
 136. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315–19 (2002).  Significantly, there was no correlation between 
shooter bias and explicit bias, as determined by a questionnaire to ascertain the 
participant’s personal views about blacks.  There was, however, a correlation 
between shooter bias and implicit bias, as ascertained by the participant’s assessment 
of how other whites viewed blacks. Id. at 1321; see also John A. Bargh et al., 
Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype 
Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238–39 (1996).  For 
further discussion of these and other social cognition experiments suggesting the 
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cases of excessive force—Rodney King,137 Amadou Diallo,138 Abner 
Louima,139 and the shooting deaths of two men during Hurricane 
Katrina140—contribute to the perception, at least in minority 
communities,141 that the use of excessive force against minorities is 
endemic.142 
 
pervasiveness of implicit racial bias in policing, see L. Song Richardson, Arrest 
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011). 
 137. Police officers beat King with billy clubs and stunned him with a Taser “stun 
gun” during a traffic stop. See Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict 
Relentless Beating; Police Accounts of Rodney Glen King’s Arrest Describe 
Repeated Striking and Kicking of the Suspect. LAPD Officers Said King’s Actions 
Justified the Treatment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at B1; Seth Mydans, Videotaped 
Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 
A1.  As a result of this beating, King suffered nine skull fractures, a shattered eye 
socket and cheekbone, a broken leg, a concussion, injuries to both knees and nerve 
damage that left his face partly paralyzed. 
 138. Diallo, an unarmed immigrant from Guinea, was standing in the vestibule of 
his apartment building in the Bronx when he was shot forty-one times by an all-white 
squad of the NYPD’s Street Crime Unit.  Evidence suggests that Diallo was reaching 
for his wallet to identify himself when he was shot. See Michael Cooper, Officers in 
Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1; 
Amy Waldman, A Hard Worker with a Gentle Smile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at 
B5. 
 139. On August 9, 1997, Louima was arrested following a verbal altercation with a 
police officer, Justin Volpe, during which another individual struck Volpe, knocking 
him down.  Volpe responded by striking Louima repeatedly en route to the police 
precinct, and by taking Louima into a bathroom where he forced a broken 
broomstick six inches into Louima’s rectum.  Louima required three operations and 
two months of hospitalization.  Officer Justin Volpe pleaded guilty to sodomizing 
Louima, and Officer Charles Schwarz was convicted by a jury of aiding in the assault. 
See David Barstow, Officer, Seeking Mercy, Admits to Louima’s Torture, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 26, 1999, at A1; Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in 
Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at A1. 
 140. See Shaila Dewan, Police Officers Charged in Deaths in Hurricane’s 
Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at A18; Campbell Robertson, Officers Guilty 
of Shooting Six in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/06danziger.html. 
 141. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 
1120 (2008) (discussing racialized “pools of knowledge”). 
 142. For example, a poll released by the Joint Center for Political and Economic 
Studies found that 43% of blacks believe police brutality and harassment are serious 
problems.  Among the general public, the figure agreeing with this belief was only 
13%. See Michael A. Fletcher, Study Tracks Blacks’ Crime Concerns; African 
Americans Show Less Confidence in System, Favor Stiff Penalties, WASH. POST, Apr. 
21, 1996, at A11.  This is not to suggest that blacks are the only minority group 
victimized by police brutality. See, e.g., COMMITTEE AGAINST ANTI-ASIAN 
VIOLENCE, POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY’S ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES, 
1986–1995, at 4–11 (1996) (noting the annual increase in reports of police violence 
against Asian Americans).  Gays and lesbians, especially those of color and those 
who fail to conform to gender expectations, have also been the victims of police 
brutality.   
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Equally troubling, the use of excessive force tends to be under-
policed.  Even when indictments are brought, convictions are rarely 
obtained.  The initial acquittal of the officers charged in the Rodney 
King beating is the rule, not the exception.  Even when the officers 
were retried on federal charges, only two of the four were convicted, 
and at sentencing the court granted their motions for sentencing 
departures, which were affirmed in Koon v. United States.143  The 
officers in the Diallo shooting were acquitted of all charges.144  
Despite overwhelming evidence of complicity by other officers, only 
two officers were convicted of charges related to the sodomy of 
Louima.  This suggests, and certainly contributes to the perception, 
that officers themselves operate in a zone of underenforcement. 
Now consider the work camera surveillance can do to address these 
issues.  First, take the racial profiling of minority drivers.  Cameras 
already monitor automated bridge and tunnel tolling systems,145 and 
photo-radars already catch red-light violations.146  But this is only the 
start.  As Elizabeth Joh has explored, technology already exists to 
police almost all traffic violations.147  Dedicated short-range 
communications technology (DSRC) means that cars are increasingly 
being equipped to communicate pertinent data to other devices, 
including data regarding the car’s location and speed, and warnings 
regarding the car’s mechanics or registration.148  While DSRC is 
already being used to reduce collisions—by alerting a driver that 
another car is approaching, for example—this same technology can be 
used to generate automatic traffic tickets.149  Clearly, such automated 
surveillance has the potential to free police to focus on actual 
policing.  But more importantly, it has the advantage of being racially 
neutral.150  Rather than using pretext stops to single out minority 
motorists, surveillance technology will “ticket” without regard to 
race.  I have argued in other work that racial profiling does more than 
 
 143. 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
 144. Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1. 
 145. See, e.g., Mike Frassinelli, Nearly 4 of 5 NJ Turnpike Drivers use E-ZPass, 
Officials Say, NJ.COM, June 26, 2012 (referring to the use of video surveillance to 
ticket toll dodgers). 
 146. Steven Tafoya Naumchick, Stop! Photographic Enforcement of Red Lights, 
30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 833, 834 (1999).  
 147. Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199 (2007). 
 148. Id. at 200. 
 149. Id. at 220–21. 
 150. Id. at 221–23. 
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simply impose a “racial tax,” as Randall Kennedy suggests.151  In fact, 
racial profiling, as a marker of inequality, is citizenship-diminishing.152  
Cameras, by contrast, neither discriminate nor engage in arbitrary 
policing.153  They treat all traffic offenders alike and therefore are 
citizenship-enhancing. 
And this is only the start.  Consider the issue of the racial profiling 
of pedestrians.  Camera surveillance, to the extent it deters crime, 
reduces the justification frequently offered by the police for engaging 
in so many stops.  Beyond that, cameras provide a record to either 
support the proffered basis for a stop and/or frisk, or to expose the 
proffered basis to be false.154  It is telling that a “Stop and Frisk 
Watch” app, designed for the New York Civil Liberties Union, 
already helps individuals document citizen-police interactions.155  
Likewise, audio surveillance already has exposed inappropriate stop-
and-frisk tactics.156  Indeed, the use of surveillance cameras could do 
the work of ferreting out particular “bad apples” in police 
departments.157 
 
 151. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1998); see also JODY 
DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF 
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13–14 (1997) (discussing a “black tax”). 
 152. Capers, supra note 107, at 19–29. 
 153. I am setting aside the issue of discriminatory placement of cameras. 
 154. As Susan Sontag observed several decades ago, “Photographs furnish 
evidence.  Something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when we’re shown a 
photograph of it. . . .  [There exists a] presumption of veracity that gives all 
photographs authority.” SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 5–6 (1977).  Of course, 
this is not to suggest that photographs cannot be manipulated. See WILLIAM J. 
MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE: VISUAL TRUTH IN THE POST-PHOTOGRAPHIC 
ERA (1992).  Nor is it to suggest that observers will always agree on a photograph’s 
“truth,” as a recent study on how different groups interpreted a video of a high-speed 
chase shows. See Dan M. Kahan, et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? 
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).  
For more on how even surveillance footage “does not lie . . . [but also cannot] tell the 
whole story,” see Jessica Silbey, Persuasive Visions: Film and Memory, L. CULTURE 
& HUMAN. 3 (Jan. 19, 2012), http://intl-lch.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/01/06/ 
1743872111423175.full.pdf. 
 155. Joshua Brustein, Stop, Frisk, Record, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at MB4. 
 156. Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For Being a F**cking 
Mutt,’ THE NATION (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170413/stopped-
and-frisked-being-fking-mutt-video (audio capture of officer refusing to give valid 
reason for stop, instead saying “For being a fucking mutt,” And later threatening, 
“I’m gonna break your fuckin’ arm, then I’m gonna punch you in the fuckin’ face”). 
 157. As Malcolm Gladwell has pointed out in his reporting on the Christopher 
Commission’s investigation into excessive violence by the LAPD, often a problem 
that seems endemic is in fact the result of a handful of “repeat offenders.”  As 
Gladwell put it, if you were to graph the perpetrators of excessive force at the LAPD, 
“it wouldn’t look like a bell curve.  It would look more like a hockey stick.” See 
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More importantly, just as cameras deter criminal and other 
inappropriate behavior, cameras likely will deter police from 
engaging in stops and frisks that cannot be justified by reasonable 
suspicion that can be well-articulated.  In short, it may deter them 
from engaging in inefficient, racialized policing, and induce them to 
engage in more efficient policing.158  Such surveillance can also play a 
role in encouraging efficient internalized regulations.159  It can also 
contribute to what one scholar identifies as a “monitory democracy,” 
i.e., the production of accounts of police activities to facilitate public 
scrutiny of the state and its actors.160  In short, camera surveillance has 
the potential to “increase the police’s accountability to the public, 
while decreasing their account ability,”161 or their ability to “patrol the 
facts.”162 
Camera surveillance has the potential to do similar work when it 
comes to the use of excessive force.  Again, the presence of cameras 
will likely serve as a deterrent.  Beyond that, camera surveillance can 
document the use of excessive force.163  Indeed, one reason why 
several incidents of brutality entered the national conversation—
including the Rodney King beating—is because eyewitnesses 
videotaped them.164  Absent such contemporaneous visual 
 
Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray: Why Problems Like Homelessness May 
Be Easier to Solve than to Manage, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, at 96, 98. 
 158. On racial profiling’s inefficiency, largely because of what he terms a “ratchet 
effect,” see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING 
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 145 (2007); Harcourt, supra note 116, at 
1329–34.  
 159. This proposition is in line with an argument Mary Fan recently made . See 
Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police 
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 129 (2012) (“When 
police are subject to the watchful gaze of courts, the public, and self-surveillance, 
they behave in better conformity with expectations.”). 
 160. JOHN KEANE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DEMOCRACY 739 (2009). 
 161. Andrew John Goldsmith, Policing’s New Visibility, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
914, 915 (2010) (emphasis in original).  Goldsmith borrows the term “account ability” 
from R. Ericson. Richard V. Ericson, The New Media and Account Ability, in 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS 135 (Philip C. Stenning 
ed., 1995). 
 162. Richard V. Ericson, Patrolling the Facts: Secrecy and Publicity in Police 
Work, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. 205 (1989). 
 163. David Harris has made a similar argument in favor of body worn video 
devices. See David A. Harris, Picture This: Body Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) 
as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 357 (2010). 
 164. The fatal beating of Nathaniel Jones in Cincinnati, captured on videotape, is 
but one example. See Brenna R. Kelly, Man Dies After Brawl with City Police 
Officers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 1, 2003.  More recent examples include the 
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documentation, the use of excessive force is difficult to prove, 
especially when the only witnesses are law enforcement officers and 
the complainant.  Even when other witnesses are present, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence—particularly Rule 609—can function to tip the 
scales against the complainant.165  Camera surveillance can become 
another tool in leveling the playing field.  Again, they can either 
support the claim of excessive force, or undermine the claim.166 
All of this points to another advantage: legitimacy.  Legitimacy 
theory suggests that individuals are more likely to voluntarily comply 
with the law when they perceive the law to be legitimate and applied 
in a non-discriminatory fashion.167  Camera surveillance, to the extent 
it does not discriminate, and to the extent it confirms or refutes police 
misconduct, is likely to increase perceptions of legitimacy.  And as I 
 
pepper spraying of sitting protesters in U.C. Davis, the fatal beating of a homeless 
man in Fullerton, California, and the assault of a cyclist. See Ian Lovett, Death of 
Homeless Man After Beating by Police Stirs Outrage in California, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
4, 2011, at A17; Sewell Chan, Police Investigate Officer in Critical Mass Video, N.Y. 
TIMES CITY ROOM (July 28, 2008, 5:07 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2008/07/28/police-investigate-officer-in-critical-mass-video/; Brian Stelter, Officers 
Placed on Leave after Pepper-Spraying Protesters, N.Y. TIMES LEDE(Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/officers-put-on-leave-after-pepper-
spraying-protesters/.  Some of this implicates the right of individuals to record the 
police.  For a discussion of this right, see Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the 
Best Disinfectant: The Case for a First Amendment Right to Record the Police, 51 
WASHBURN L.J. 349 (2012). 
 165. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our Criminal Network, and The 
Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 459, 465–67 (2011) (discussing impact of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609 in police brutality cases). 
 166. Lolita Buckner Inniss makes a similar argument: 
[V]ideo surveillance sometimes provides much needed valorization for . . . 
less regarded private people [those possessing little power or authority].  
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other relatively powerless people in society, video surveillance is the 
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Lolita Buckner Innis, Video Surveillance as White Witnesses, AIN’T I A FEMINIST 
LEGAL SCHOLAR TOO? (Sept. 30, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://innissfls.blogspot.com/ 
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have detailed elsewhere, the benefits of increased legitimacy are 
manifold.168  Individuals will be more likely to voluntarily comply with 
the law.169  And individuals will be more likely to “perform their duty 
as citizens” and voluntarily assist the police in maintaining an ordered 
society.170 
Such surveillance can also serve to educate the public at large.  
Polls continue to show that minorities and non-minorities have very 
different perceptions about the police.171  This is not to say that either 
group is wrong, but rather it suggests that it is difficult to be aware of 
what one does not see.  Surveillance recording can make the use of 
excessive force or profiling “real” to those who, because of race or 
class, will likely never experience it.172  This, in turn, can induce those 
individuals to “buy in” to increased reforms to make policing more 
egalitarian. 
Finally, there is the fundamental issue of crime prevention.  But my 
argument here is slightly different from the usual “law and order” 
argument of surveillance advocates.  My argument turns to 
communities, especially those hit hardest by crime.  To be sure, the 
complaint in such communities is about over-enforcement in the form 
of police harassment, profiling, and excessive force.  But, as 
Alexandra Natapoff has pointed out, the complaint is also about 
under-enforcement.173  The perception in these communities is that 
“whites generally benefit from more responsive law enforcement, 
whether it is the speed with which the police respond to a 9-1-1 call, 
or the number of officers assigned to a case, or having a police 
department offer a cash reward for information.”174  All of this has the 
expressive effect of “send[ing] an official message of dismissal and 
devaluation.”175  Moreover, these complaints have evidentiary 
 
 168. Capers, supra note 106, at 877–78. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.; see also Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why 
Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 231 (2008). 
 171. For example, according to a recent survey, 56% of all blacks believe they have 
been treated unfairly by the police because of their race, and 46% believe racism 
against blacks by police officers is “very common.”  By contrast, only 11% of whites 
share this belief. Race and Ethnicity (p. 2), POLLINGREPORT.COM, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/race2.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
 172. Lautt, supra note 164, at 350–51. 
 173. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–17 
(2006). 
 174. Capers, supra note 106, at 855. 
 175. Natapoff, supra note 173, at 1749. 
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support.  For example, a study of policing in Boston found that police 
“offer less service to victims (they are less prone to offer assistance to 
residents and less likely to file incident reports)” in minority 
communities as compared to “higher status neighborhoods with lower 
crime rates.”176  Not surprisingly, this issue has prompted Randall 
Kennedy to argue that “the principle injury suffered by African-
Americans in relation to criminal matters is not over-enforcement but 
under-enforcement of the laws.”177  Surveillance cameras, to the 
extent they can play a role in solving crime and identifying 
perpetrators, do some of the work of addressing this problem.178  They 
certainly do the work of refuting any law enforcement claim that 
crime in these communities is too difficult to solve. 
I began this Article by referencing the concern, voiced by many 
civil libertarians, of a world in which Big Brother watches us when we 
are in public.  It is a frightening scenario.  But it doesn’t have to be, if 
we can agree that public surveillance, to pass constitutional muster, 
must be reasonable in terms of time, location, execution, and notice.  
That citizens would have access to surveillance footage to challenge 
police actions should also be a factor in any reasonableness 
determination.  But my larger point is this: the possibility that Big 
Brother will watch us does not have to be frightening.  The task is to 
reimagine Big Brother so that he not only watches us; he also watches 
over us—to reimagine Big Brother as protective, and as someone who 
will be there to tell our side of the story. 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing should make clear, I have been thinking about the 
work camera surveillance can do to not only reduce crime, but also to 
make the way we police fairer.  I have been thinking about the work 
camera surveillance can do to make policing—which is currently very 
racialized and class-based—more egalitarian and race-neutral.  I have 
been thinking about the work camera surveillance can do to ensure 
 
 176. Sara E. Stoutland, The Multiple Dimensions of Trust in Resident/Police 
Relations in Boston, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 226, 231 (2001). 
 177. KENNEDY, supra note 151, at 19. 
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public spaces, with an approval rate of 71% as of 2007. See YESIL, supra note 8, at 3–
4 (reviewing polling data).  It is also telling that, in New York at least, cameras 
“appear least where they are desired most: in some of the city’s most crime-ridden 
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mounting violence and all of its attendant psychological disruption.” Gina Bellafante, 
The Watchmen’s Misdirected Gaze, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at B1. 
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that we are all equal citizens.  In short, I have been thinking about the 
work camera surveillance can do, in James Baldwin’s words, to “make 
America what America must become.”179 
Although cameras are not a cure-all, they can certainly make a 
difference in apprehending criminals.  As I have already mentioned, 
we saw this possibility play out with the quick apprehension of Faisal 
Shahzad in connection with his plot to detonate explosives in Times 
Square.180  Now multiply that by thousands.  Every day, police are 
able to identify and apprehend law offenders through the use of 
surveillance footage.  Indeed, the day that I began writing this Article, 
a seventy-three-year-old woman was raped, beaten, and robbed in 
Central Park.181  Within twenty-four hours, the suspect, a drifter from 
Virginia, was in custody, thanks largely to video surveillance images 
of the suspect.182 
But equally important, such surveillance can function to make sure 
that those who police us do so in a way that is fair and egalitarian.  
Just recently, a police officer in Philadelphia was captured on tape 
hitting a woman in the face.183  But this is just one of many incidents 
that camera surveillance has made real.  In Minnesota, an officer was 
filmed kicking a man in the face during an arrest.184  In Davis, 
California, a police officer was captured on video pepper spraying 
sitting protestors.185  In Los Angeles, two officers were caught on 
surveillance camera “slamming a nurse on the ground twice—and 
then fist bumping afterward—during a recent traffic stop.”186  In 
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Fullerton, California, video and audio captured the beating death of a 
homeless man by two police officers.187  In Venice Beach, cameras 
captured four officers beating a skateboarder, who later received 
treatment for a concussion, a broken nose, and a fractured 
cheekbone.188  In New York, Internal Affairs investigated four officers 
after they were captured on video “viciously pummeling and kicking” 
a suspect following a stop-and-frisk.189  Surveillance cameras also 
caught two New York City police officers using their fists and a baton 
to beat a young man in a Jewish Community Center,190 and caught a 
police officer assaulting a cyclist.191  Of course, cameras also can 
capture instances of grace and compassion, such as when a tourist 
photographed a police officer in New York giving a pair of shoes to a 
homeless man.192 
Of all of these uses of video surveillance, it is the quick 
apprehension of the drifter who raped the seventy-three-year-old 
woman in Central Park that sticks with me the most.  Perhaps because 
in my mind, it takes me back to the case of the Central Park jogger, 
the rape that shocked New York City in 1989, prompting Donald 
Trump to run full page advertisements in four New York newspapers 
calling for the reinstatement of the death penalty,193 and prompting a 
manhunt that resulted in the arrest, interrogation, prosecution, and 
conviction of five black and Hispanic teens.194  It would be thirteen 
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years before the city realized that it had rushed to judgment.  In 2002, 
a New York court vacated their convictions after DNA evidence and 
a confession linked the crime to a serial rapist, Matias Reyes, acting 
alone.195  By then, the five youths had each spent between seven and 
thirteen years in prison.196  Suppose we had surveillance cameras in 
Central Park then, in 1989? 
For too long, conventional thinking has identified the Fourth 
Amendment as the problem when it comes to camera surveillance.  
Maybe, just maybe, we should start thinking of the Fourth 
Amendment as the solution. 
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